

## Message Text

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TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY  
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

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USSALT TWO/CTB

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, SOPN

SUBJECT: JULY 19 ROUNDUP: PRESS ITEMS OF ARMS CONTROL  
INTEREST

LONDON FOR AMB/EX, SOFIA FOR AMBASSADOR

1. CRAIG COVSUIT OF AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY  
REPORTED THAT PENTAGON IS DESIGNING TARGET SPACECRAFT THAT  
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COULD BE USED TO TEST LETHALITY OF U.S. ANTISATELLITE  
WEAPONS NOW UNDER DESIGN IN THREE SEPARATE PROGRAMS. TOTAL  
COST TO COMPLETION OF THREE WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND TARGET  
SATELLITE COULD EXCEED 586 MILLION DOLLARS, COVSUIT SAID.  
HE REPORTED THAT UP TO EIGHT OF TARGET SPACECRAFT MAY BE  
PROCURED IF U.S. DECIDES TO ADVANCE U.S. ANTISATELLITE  
EFFORT INTO SPACE TEST PHASE IN EARLY 1980S IN RESPONSE TO

CONTINUING SOVIET KILLER SATELLITE TESTS OR SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO COME TO AN ANTISATELLITE AGREEMENT AT BARGAINING TABLE. COVSUIT SAID "ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE SOVIETS WILL TRY TO COMBINE NEGOTIATION FOR AN ANTISATELLITE BAN WITH INCREASES IN THEIR OWN ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO OBTAIN NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE. ADMINISTRATION NOTES THAT SIMILAR INCREASE IN FORCE CAPABILITY OF SOVIET STRATEGIC SYSTEMS HAS OCCURRED DURING SALT. TO ENGAGE IN SIMILAR INCREASE WITH ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS DURING NEGOTIATIONS WOULD RISK SUBSTANTIAL U.S. RESPONSE IN TERMS OF ACCELERATING U.S. ANTISATELLITE PROGRAM, ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES."

2. WILLIAM BEECHER, WRITING IN JULY 16 BOSTON GLOBE, SAID SOVIET UNION "HAS, FOR FIRST TIME, AGREED TO REMOVE ITS OBJECTIONS TO TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW AMERICAN MOBILE, MULTIPLE WARHEAD MISSILE." BEECHER SAID PRICE ASKED BY GROMYKO DURING GENEVA TALKS WITH VANCE "WAS DESCRIBED BY ONE WELL-PLACED DIPLOMATIC SOURCE AS 'WAY TOO HIGH.' HE WOULDN'T GO INTO DETAILS." BEECHER SAID VANCE HAD INFORMED GROMYKO THAT U.S. INSISTED ON PRESERVING OPTION TO DEVELOP AND FIELD NEW ICBM DURING LIFE OF SALT TWO TREATY. SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO BARGAIN OVER HOW THAT MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED WAS BASIS FOR VANCE'S GUARDED OPTIMISM LAST WEEK, BEECHER SAID. BEECHER REPORTED THAT ANOTHER MAJOR ISSUE RAISED BY U.S. AT VANCE-GROMYKO TALKS UNCLASSIFIED

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WAS MULTIPLE AIM POINT BASING SYSTEM FOR AMERICAN ICBM'S. BEECHER SAID GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS ISSUE, AND IT WAS FELT SOVIETS WANTED MORE TIME TO ANALYZE IMPLICATIONS BEFORE REACTING. UNDER THIS BASING SYSTEM, U.S. WOULD DRILL EXTRA SILOS FOR "SORT OF STRATEGIC SHELL GAME IN WHICH SOME MINUTEMAN MISSILES WOULD BE SHUNTED RANDOMLY FROM HOLE TO HOLE," BEECHER NOTED. "IT HAS BEEN LEARNED RELIABLY," HE REPORTED, "THAT CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS TAKING POSITION THAT NEW HOLES WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED LAUNCHERS UNDER TERMS OF SALT...ONLY IF NEW HOLES ARE NOT COUNTED AS LAUNCHERS COULD U.S. GO AHEAD WITH ITS SCHEME. FOR YEARS U.S. HAS INSISTED THAT ICBM CEILINGS BE MEASURED BY NUMBER OF 'LAUNCHERS' EACH SIDE HAS, NOT NUMBER OF SILOS. THIS WAS CONSCIOUSLY DONE, SOURCES SAY, TO PRESERVE OPTION FOR SOMEDAY GOING TO SORT OF SCHEME THAT HAS RECENTLY BEEN EMBRACED BY ADMINISTRATION. SINCE SALT TWO TREATY WOULD LIMIT NUMBER OF MISSILES AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS ON EACH SIDE TO 2,250, AND SINCE ADMINISTRATION IS THINKING OF DRILLING ABOUT 3,000 HOLES TO PLAY SHELL GAME WITH 300 SLIGHTLY MODIFIED MINUTEMAN MISSILES, AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS ON WHAT CONSTITUTES LAUNCHER IS CRITICAL. DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAY ADMINISTR-

ATION WAS PREPARED SIMPLY TO ASSERT THAT SINCE NOTHING IN MORE THAN 50 DRAFT PAGES OF SALT TWO PRECLUDES SHELL GAME SILOS, THEY ARE PERMITTED...SOVIETS ARE EXPECTED TO MAKE AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THIS SCHEME, BUT COULD, IN END, AGREE TO IT FOR ONE OF NUMBER OF REASONS, U.S. ANALYSTS SUGGEST." BEECHER SAID SOVIETS MAY WANT TO DEVELOP SHELL GAME OF THEIR OWN, OR THEY MIGHT THINK ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TROUBLE GETTING MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS FROM CONGRESS FOR NEW BASING SYSTEM. "AND IF CARTER GETS MONEY, RUSSIANS MIGHT PREFER IT BE SPENT THAT WAY, RATHER THAN IN OTHER MILITARY PROGRAMS," BEECHER ADDED. "MORE IMPORTANTLY,

PERHAPS, ADMINISTRATION COULD TELL RUSSIANS THAT WITHOUT RIGHT TO PROTECT MINUTEMAN FORCE, WHICH U.S. INTELLIGENCE UNCLASSIFIED

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SAYS MAY WELL BECOME VULNERABLE TO SURPRISE ATTACK BY 1981 OR 1982, SENATE IS LIKELY TO REJECT SALT TWO TREATY, CREATING EVEN WORSE RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO NATIONS, POSSIBLY TRIGGERING OTHER U.S. STRATEGIC PROGRAMS OUTSIDE OF SALT RESTRAINTS," BEECHER SAID.

3. EDWARD BASSETT OF AVIATION WEEK REPORTED THAT CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE STUDY SAYS PROCUREMENT OF 75 WIDE-BODY AIRCRAFT ARMED WITH 4,800 CRUISE MISSILES COULD COUNTER INCREASING SOVIET ABILITY TO DESTROY U.S. SILO-BASED ICBM'S AND STILL ALLOW U.S. TO SIGN SALT AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD COST 15.6 BILLION DOLLARS, STUDY SAYS, LEAST EXPENSIVE WAY OF AUGMENTING U.S. DETERRENT FORCES. STUDY NOTES THIS "WOULD BE ONLY WAY TO ACQUIRE SECOND-STRIKE COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUSLY POSING FIRST-STRIKE THREAT TO SOVIET ICBM FORCE." BASSETT SAID STUDY DID NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY THAT CRUISE MISSILES COULD BECOME VULNERABLE TO IMPROVE SOVIET FIGHTERS AND SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES. STUDY SAYS U.S. COULD AFFORD TO AGREE TO SALT PROVISIONS BANNING MOBILE ICBM'S, NEW ICBM'S AND NEW SLBM'S IF IT OPTED FOR INCREASED NUMBER OF CRUISE MISSILES. "PERMANENT LIMITS ON RANGE OF CRUISE MISSILES, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE (AND) U.S. COULD NOT AGREE TO REPORTED SALT TWO POSITION THAT WOULD ALLOW ONLY EXISTING HEAVY BOMBERS -- THAT IS, B-52S -- TO LAUNCH LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES," STUDY SAYS. CHRISTOPHER

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## Message Attributes

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